Section 911 Tax Reform by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1970
Section 911 Tax Reform
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "Section 911 Tax Reform" (1970). Minnesota Law Review. 2964.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2964
Section 911 Tax Reform
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the growth of foreign trade is vital to the political
interests of the United States, United States Government policy
should be designed to implement and encourage expansion of
international trade insofar as it is realistically possible consid-
ering the short term restrictive measures necessary to alleviate
balance of payment problems.1 An increase in foreign trade will
not only generate domestic growth but will serve United States
foreign policy by increasing the economic strength of those coun-
tries which can assist the United States in preserving world
peace.2 In addition, continuing problems with our balance of
payments indicate that the prosperity of the United States is, to
a large extent, dependent upon our ability to offset imports and
other expenditures abroad with an equal or greater expansion
of exports.
In the past, a number of programs have utilized tax incen-
tives to induce desired behavior from individuals and corpora-
tions3 in order to encourage foreign trade.4  Section 911 of the
Internal Revenue Code,' exempting certain foreign income from
federal income taxes, is one of the measures adopted to increase
foreign trade. The section operates as an incentive for Ameri-
cans to work in countries with a lower tax rate and as a mechan-
ism to achieve tax equality with nonresident citizens of countries
who tax only on the basis of residence.
The exemption offered by section 911 grants, in theory at
least, tax benefits that will raise after-tax income to cover in-
creased living expenses and also yield an additional amount
which will constitute a bonus to work abroad. These benefits
will indirectly accrue to United States corporations since the
necessity of increasing salaries for foreign employees is at least
partially alleviated.
Theoretically, the section 911 exemption serves as an incen-
tive because unlike the tax credit which merely prevents double
1. See R. TRIFFIx, THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AD THE FOREIGN
INVESTMENT POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES (1966).
2. A. CAIRNCROSS, FACTORS iN EcoNoMIc DEVELOPMENT 203 (1962).
3. See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 921, 941, 954(b), 955 & 963(c)(4).
4. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 960, and Foreign
Assistance Acts for previous years.
5. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 911.
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taxation, the exemption allows Americans to benefit from re-
duced foreign taxes and to avoid the danger of double taxation
when foreign nations rely on taxes different from our income
tax.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the operation of sec-
tion 911 and to determine its effectiveness in accomplishing these
objectives. It will be urged that the section be altered and in-
corporated into a comprehensive tax incentive and aid program
which would operate with substantially greater effectiveness in
inducing the desired economic behavior. In addition, it will be
suggested that section 911 would be more effective if its bene-
fits were available primarily to underdeveloped countries.
II. THE BENEFITS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Trade, according to the classical theories of comparative ad-
vantage," results in a "general increase of the productive pow-
ers of the world. ' 7 It is, therefore, in the best interests of all
countries to foster the growth of international trade. In an ex-
panding world market, demand for goods increases, resulting in
greater production and economic growth in the international
economy.8
The United States has, in the past, recognized that its future
6. Comparative advantage can be defined in terms of compara-
tive cheapness. A country will produce and export those goods which
are cheapest to produce in terms of the physical resources required.
If a country has absolute advantage in the production of all goods, its
total well-being is still increased by producing those goods in which it
has comparative advantage. World resources are used most efficiently
if all countries produce those goods for which their resources are best
adapted, and this results in an increase in total production and income.
L. REYNOLDS, EcoNomIcs 371-73 (1963).
7. 2 J. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF PoLrTIcAL EcONOmY ch. XVII, § 5
(1848). This approach to trade basically recognizes the advantages
accruing to each country and the international economy in general
when international specialization occurs, with each country producing
those goods for which its comparative advantage is greatest. However,
there are other growth transmitting aspects of international trade. By
widening markets, sources of supply and the scope of the division of
labor, trade becomes a dynamic force, permitting greater use of ma-
chinery, stimulating innovation, overcoming technical divisibilities,
raising the productivity of labor and enabling the trading country to
enjoy increased returns and development. See also Myint, The "Classical
Theory" of International Trade and the Underdeveloped Countries,
68 EcoN. J. 318-19 (June 1958).
8. In addition to economic benefits, a growing and vigorous trade
among nations will enhance political understanding and cooperation.
A. CAIRNcRoss, supra note 2, at 203. But see C. KINDLEBERGER, FORIGN
TRADE A THE NATIONAL EcONOmy 209 (19e2).
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security and ultimate economic benefit are dependent upon the
welfare of other amicable or neutral nations. Both foreign aid
programs and sporadic attempts to create freer international
trade have reflected this policy.9 However, the protectionist
policies of most countries, including the United States, have re-
sulted in the erection of a number of barriers, including tariffs,
double taxation and quotas, which restrict the free movement of
international trade.10 If these protectionist policies were dis-
carded, the resulting increased trade and accompanying eco-
nomic yield would increase international efficiency and redistri-
bution of wealth.'1
Of more immediate interest to the United States, however,
is the balance of payments deficit that currently endangers the
value of the dollar. The limitations on private foreign invest-
ment abroad,' 2 the reduction of government expenditures
abroad 3 and greater restrictions on the flow of loans abroad' 4
are designed to support our current balance of payments posi-
tion. Since financial transfers of dollars abroad have exceeded
real transfers of goods by substantial margins in recent years,
9. See S. WEINTRAuB, TRADE PREFERENCES FOR LESS-DEVELOPED
CouNTRIEs (1967); Metzger, The Prospects for the Kennedy Round,
1965 J. Bus. LAW 103.
10. H. NEWCOMER, INTERNATIONAL AIDS TO OVERSEAS INVESTMENT
AND TRADE 45-50 (1964) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL AIDS].
Given the assumption of free trade, countries will tend to specialize
increasingly in the particular categories and subclassifications of man-
ufacturing in which they enjoy a comparative advantage. Overall
standards of living increase because consumers can obtain lower prices.
Some industries in the United States which may be at a comparative
disadvantage will be pressured by increased growth and industrializa-
tion abroad; the patterns of trade will change. Generally, however,
there will be growth in the trade of manufactured goods in the inter-
national economy, causing economic growth in the United States. Id.
at 5-6, 19-20. See also INT'L CHAMER OF CoaMERCE, AVoIDANcE OF
DOUBLE TAXATION 15 (1955).
11. G. MEIER, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIzCS OF DEVELOPMENT
310 (1968) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS].
12. In order to reduce balance of payments deficits, the Voluntary
Cooperation Program for Business, was initiated in 1965 and made
mandatory as of January 1, 1968, under the control of the Commerce De-
partment. This program was designated to restrict new capital com-
mitments abroad by United States investors. See CCH 1969 BALAuNCE
OF PAYMENTS REPORTER ff 173, at 135.
13. The Government is attempting to reduce spending abroad by
government personnel and the military. See id. 11 4605-31, at 4601-4701.
14. An effort is also being made to restrict the outflow of foreign
loans under the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program, adminis-
tered by the Federal Reserve, which has proven effective in limiting
foreign loans and investments by banks. See id. 151, at 133.
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the Government is trying to limit both public and private for-
eign expenditures that have an unfavorable balance of payments
effect. 15 Within these restrictive guidelines, however, continu-
ing efforts are being made to encourage exports of goods-real
transfers-which will help restore a favorable balance of pay-
ments.16 In this sense, the encouragement of foreign trade re-
mains an element of our foreign policy.
III. OPERATION AND PURPOSE OF SECTION 911
A. HISTORY OF SECTION 911
The Government has a number of methods available to en-
courage investment activity abroad by inducing desired invest-
ment behavior.17 These methods include tax exemptions, re-
duced tax rates by grant and tax deferral,' 8 all of which may
increase after-tax dollars if taxes at the source of income are
lower.
Since the sixteenth amendment has always been read to al-
low the United States to tax its citizens regardless of their resi-
dence,19 Congress in 1926 enacted section 116 (a) of the Internal
Revenue Code "to help our foreign trade and to put all Americans
who are working abroad in a position of equality with their com-
petitors .... -20 All income earned abroad was exempt if a
15. The ideal investment for balance of payments purposes pro-
duces corresponding real and financial transfers within a reasonably
short time.
16. The Government is encouraging increased efforts to expand
exports, and is endeavoring to reduce import barriers abroad which
restrict export growth. See BALANCE OF PAYMENTS REPORTER, supLra
note 12, 1 1 171-185, at 134-38.
17. There have been few efforts to gz.ant tax exemptions, reduced
taxation or favorable deductions to encourage investment abroad. L.
KRAUSE & K. DAM, FEDERAL TAx TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INcoME 27-29
(1964) [hereinafter cited as KRAUSE & DAM]. One of these is section 911
and another is the favorable treatment granted Western Hemisphere
Trade Corporations under sections 921 and 922 of the Code. Examples
of this type of incentive used domestically are more prevalent. The
favorable depletion allowance granted to the extraction industries, sec-
tions 611-13, and the investment credit, sections 38 and 46-48, are
examples.
18. Surrey, The United States Taxaticn of Foreign Income, 1 J. or
LAw & EcoN. 72, 74-77 (1958).
19. See Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1.924); Revenue Act of 1913,
ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166.
20. Krichbaum v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 515, 519 (E.D. Tenn.
1956), quoting statement by Senator Reed at 75 CONG. REC. 10410 (1932);
accord, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fiske's Estate, 128 F.2d
487, 490 (7th Cir. 1942). See also H.R. REP. No. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
[Vol. 54:823
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citizen was a bona fide foreign resident for six months.21 The
predecessor of section 911 was designed to equate the tax burden
on Americans with that placed on foreigners whose country of
citizenship taxed on the basis of residence.22 In addition, a tax
incentive was thought necessary to encourage Americans to par-
ticipate in foreign trade in view of the hardships encountered
when living and working abroad.
23
Congress has amended section 911 on several occasions since
1926.24 Initially, six months' nonresidence was sufficient to qual-
ify for the exemption 25 but abuses by those who stayed abroad
for short periods solely to use the tax benefit led to a require-
ment of bona fide foreign residency.26 The "physical presence"
exemption was introduced in 1951 to allow an exemption for all
compensation earned abroad if the taxpayer could show that he
was present in a foreign country or countries for 510 days (17
months) of an 18-month period.27 To qualify for preferential
treatment as a foreign resident, a citizen had to be a bona fide
7 (1926); see TAx INSTITuTE, TAxATioN AND OPERATIONS ABROAD 245
(1960); 75 CONG. REC. 10410-11 (1932) (remarks of Senator Reed).
21. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 213(b) (14), 44 Stat. 26; subse-
quently § 116 (a) of Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, 45 Stat. 823.
22. See 67 CONG. REc. 3781 (1926) (remarks by Senator Smoot).
Portugal, Italy and Ireland are examples of countries which do not
tax citizens abroad. After limited periods of up to four years of foreign
residency, nearly all European countries do not tax foreign income.
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, FISCAL
INCENTIVES FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 98 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as FISCAL INCENTIVES].
23. The absence of the many comforts of life, the lack of
sanitation in certain communities and other unhealthy con-
ditions, the inadequacy of educational facilities in others, the
difficulty of mastering foreign languages, the impossibility of
harmonizing with the customs of foreign peoples, the disappoint-
ments in business ventures-these are but a few of the many
motives which contribute to the early return of so many Ameri-
cans to this country after a comparatively brief foreign resi-
dence.
67 CONG. REc. 3783 (1926) (article by Richard P. Momsen). It is not
cheaper to live abroad if one desires to maintain the same standard of
living. See Note, Section 911 of the Internal Revenue Code and the
Foreign-Based Partner, 74 YALE L.J. 956, 957 (1965).
24. For a short history of these changes, see Note, Federal Income
Taxation-Exclusion of Income Earned Abroad-Interpretation of the
Exception to Section 911 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 41 TuLAiE
L. REV. 480 (1967). See also Krichbaum v. United States, 138 F.
Supp. 515 (E.D. Tenn. 1956); TAx MANAGEBN,T INC., FOREIGN OPERA-
TIONS-EMPLOYMENT OF CITIZENS ABROAD 6 (1963).
25. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 213(b) (14), 44 Stat. 26.
26. Revenue Act of 1952, ch. 619, § 116 (a) - (b), 56 Stat. 841.
27. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 116 (a) (2), 65 Stat. 498 (now
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 911).
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resident for an uninterrupted period of three years.28 To pre-
vent abuse of the "physical presence" provision as a tax avoid-
ance device, primarily by wealthy entertainers, Congress in 1951
imposed a ceiling of $20,000 per year on the amount of income
eligible for exemption.29 The section also limited tax exempt
income of citizens who were bona fide foreign residents to $35,000
(and, in 1964, $25,000)3 0 to prevent excessive tax-free compensa-
tion from escaping United States taxing authority. The history
of these amendments indicates that the major thrust of section
911 is to encourage managers, technicians and skilled workmen
to go overseas to complete specific projects in furtherance of
national political and economic objectives. 31
B. ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION FOR FOREIGN EmPLOYMENT
When large amounts of capital are invested in projects re-
quiring sophisticated technology and difficult marketing and
distribution plans, an investor wants management to be en-
trusted to individuals with the necessary skills and experience. 32
Thus, while the enterprise will probably recruit nationals for
staff positions, it will import expatriates for the managerial and
technical positions. In order to attract qualified men to work
abroad, the generally adopted procedure is to compensate for the
cost of maintaining a standard of living equivalent or superior 33
to that enjoyed in the United States.3 4
28. Id.
29. Id. The House recommended repeal because although the meas-
ure was designed to induce those with technical skill to go abroad,
it was being abused by nontechnical people for tax avoidance schemes.
However, the Senate thought it particularly desirable to encourage
men with technical skills to go abroad, and a limit on the amount
exemptable was thought sufficient to curb abuses. S. REP. No. 685,
83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1953).
30. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 911(c) (1) (B).
31. See S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1951); Commis-
sioner v. Wolfe, 361 F.2d 62, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion);
Newman, Tax Administration in Striped Trousers: The International
Operations Program of the Internal Revenue Service, 12 TAx L. REV.
171, 182 (1957).
32. INT'L Cu.HaWM OF COMMERcE, TaXATION PoriciEs IN RELATION
TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 24 (1961).
33. BusINEss INT'L CORP., WORLDWID] EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 7
(1967). Roughly 73 percent of United States firms with employees
abroad pay a premium as an inducement to work abroad. Id. at 30.
34. A substantial number of additional costs are involved. Because
of the temporary nature of residency abroad, men often must maintain
financial contacts, sometimes even a residence, in the United States,
which double costs. Education and general maintenance costs are
[Vol. 54:823
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C. THE FUNCTION OF SKILLED PERSONNEL ABROAD
If it is assumed that section 911 is a factor in inducing
skilled personnel to go abroad, it must still be determined
whether United States technicians and managers contribute to
the growth of American investment activity. Several factors
may be considered. First, in industrialized and developing na-
tions, American personnel can at least use their marketing abili-
ties to increase the distribution of American manufactured goods.
Second, in underdeveloped nations, a deficiency of knowledge
itself is often the greatest handicap to economic growth; contact
with more advanced economies provides an expeditious way of
overcoming this deficiency.35 One of the principal merits of
private as opposed to public investment is that it carries with it
an "integral ingredient of technical assistance-the managerial
and technical knowledge which are usually in even shorter sup-
ply than capital." 36  The low level of education makes the im-
portation of technical knowledge and skills an indispensable pre-
requisite to technological progress.37 It seems probable, then,
that the diffusion of United States technical and managerial as-
sistance can supply a factor needed for international economic
growth.38
higher, and state insurance, pension schemes and social security (all of
which give no benefit to the short-term resident) must be paid to the
foreign country. Id. at 24.
35. A. CAIRNCROSS, supra note 2, at 179-180. See also INTER-
rATIONAL EcoNomIcs, supra note 11, at 220.
36. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 11, at 135, 141.
37. A. FATOuROs, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVES-
TORS 6 (1962) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES]. This
shortage of trained persons often inhibits growth in a developing econ-
omy. Trained management is scarce even when capacity is not fully
used, since managerial talents are not closely related to output levels.
This bottleneck can be overcome by relative changes in factor rewards,
but the process will be slow if it must be overcome by internal re-
sources alone because it rests mainly on the educational system. KRAUSE
& DAM, supra note 17, at 61.
38. BRITISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND COIPARATIVE LAW,
THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 1 (1962) [hereinafter cited as ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTEC-
TION].
Even though only a small amount of private capital, relative
to government loans and grants, has gone to poor countries, the
belief persists that capital from official sources is only a tran-
sitional arrangement, and that foreign economic aid should be
gradually replaced by a flow of private financial resources. To
this end, considerable interest is being shown in measures that
might promote foreign investment and allow it to contribute
more effectively to the development of the recipient countries.
INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIcs, supra note 11, at 133. Practically speaking,
19701
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IV. LIMITATIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SECTION 911
A. EXEMPTIONS AS INCENTIVES TO ASSIST FOREIGN TRADE
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SECTION 911
A personal incentive such as section 911 will not entice peo-
ple to work abroad unless they or the corporation for whom
they work are able to predict a profi. In making a decision on
the profit making potential of a projected enterprise, taxes are
only one factor to be considered in the total investment climate,
and incentives are only one element of the tax structure. 39 Thus,
the link between the section 911 exemption and actual invest-
ment or employment abroad is tenuous because of the complex-
ity of considerations concerning the general investment climate.40
Perhaps the only time the investment decision would be affected
by the exemption is where the projected profit would be too low
to encourage investment without the exemption.
The investment decision is particularly complex in those
underdeveloped countries where the political, economic, social
and cultural background presents additional problems. A tax
incentive cannot be a significant inducement to investment of
labor or capital until at least a minimal infrastructure of social
overhead capital 41 has been constructed. A lack of basic utili-
ties, skilled labor and sufficient market demand will make mod-
em industrial or commercial enterprises most unprofitable. 42
private investment is much easier for the people of an underdeveloped
area to accept than United States foreign aid, and it is not as open to
public censure. H. JOHNSON, ECONOMC POLICIES TOWARD LESs DE-
VELOPED COUNTRIES 126 (1967).
39. There is evidence that factors indicating generally favorable
and fair tax treatment in a foreign country are considered to have
greater attraction than the existence of tax incentives. ENCOURAGE-
MENT AND PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 3.
40. The tax incentive approach alters net yields from work and
therefore has some value in terms of the economic man who judges his
output on the basis of his net return and thus goes where he receives
the best net return for his work. See FISZ::AL INCENTIVES, supra note 22,
at 25.
41. Factors other than taxes such as political and monetary sta-
bility, present and potential markets, adequacy of credit, and the avail-
ability of social overhead capital like raw materials, labor, power,
transportation and technicians and managerial personnel in the area,
are significant in investment decisions. J. HELLEa & K. KAUFFMAN,
TAX INCENTIVEs FOR INDUSTRY IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIEs 5 (1963).
[hereinafter cited as TAX INCENTIVES].
42. B. Bn'rxER & L. EBB, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN
INCOME AND FOREIGN PERSONS 20-26 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
BITTKER & EBB].
[Vol. 54":823
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Certainly, as an infrastructure develops and opportunities for
commercial and industrial enterprises emerge, tax incentives to
encourage these activities will also become more effective.43
Consequently, tax incentives for investment in any country, par-
ticularly developing countries, cannot by themselves suffice to
convert the flow of capital from a trickle to a stream. Unless the
developing countries have an atmosphere which is receptive to
foreign investment and technology, incentives adopted by capital
exporting countries will not be effective.
There is, however, reasonable justification for believing that
fiscal incentives may have some effect in inducing desired be-
havior.44 In countries such as the United States where both tax
morality and rates are high, a possibility of substantial tax sav-
ings is a strong inducement for taxpayers to engage in the de-
sired activity.45 Even in instances where tax considerations are
unimportant to a business decision, a tax incentive may publi-
cize and enhance the country's favorable attitude towards invest-
ment. Also, even an ineffective tax incentive has one advantage
over direct foreign aid since the tax is generally not subject to
annual review by Congress.
In order to maximize the effectiveness of any tax incentive,
one author asserts that the incentive requires: (1) sufficient size
to attract attention and provoke new consideration of developing
43. TAx INcENTvrs, supra note 41, at 10. An industrialist trying
to establish himself in an underdeveloped country may find his market
too limited, the variety of his output too wide to allow him to use the
most advanced techniques, and the investment necessary to train labor
and provide ancillary services too large to make it possible to raise
capital on reasonable terms. These factors apply with less force after
the initial stages of industrialization. A. CAzaNCROSS, supra note 2, at
206.
44. Some sources would disagree. One study using interviews
with businessmen failed to disclose any instance in which federal tax
policy prevented a particular investment from being undertaken or in
which a rejected investment could have been induced by exemption
from United States taxes. E. BmuuOw & I. WENDER4 FOREIGN INVEST-
WMNT Arm TAxATIoN 170 (1954). Another study also indicates that
tax incentives are not credited with substantial increases in investment.
"The almost unanimous opinion of tax officials from numerous coun-
tries ... has been that the incentives in their countries have been
ineffectual, administratively cumbersome, and costly in revenues and
fairness." TAx INcENTrvEs, supra note 41, at 223. See also TAx IN-
STI.UTE, supra note 20, at 227.
45. The investment credit, the depletion allowance and special tax
treatment for small business companies are examples of preferential
tax treatment in the Code. There are the same possibilities for appli-
cation of effective incentives for investment in developing areas. See
IscAL INcENTIVES, supra note 22, at 25.
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countries (an attempt to economize will waste potential bene-
fits); (2) a rational design in which the incentive goes directly
to the desired activity; (3) coordination with our economic aid
program and tailoring in accord with economic aid principles;
(4) high selectivity to reduce windfalls which may waste tax
revenue and cause tax inequity, and to limit investments to those
giving the most significant contribution to growth, and (5) ini-
tial research to examine the effects of the incentive to ensure its
proper performance.46 If an exemption meets the above require-
ments, it is probable that the exemption does influence economic
activity, although to what exact degree remains uncertain.47
B. THE BENEFIT OF THE SECTION 911 EXMPTION
The effectiveness of section 911 in inducing skilled men to go
abroad depends primarily on the tax structure of the individual
foreign country. Section 911 becomes less effective as tax rates
are increased and is of no value when foreign taxes are equal to
or greater than United States taxes.48
In nearly all instances, 49 the exemption offered in section 911
46. Hellawell, United States Income Taxation and Less Developed
Countries: A Critical Appraisal, 66 CoLum. L. REV. 1393, 1423-24 (1966).
47. It is possible to know approximately how much is lost by cre-
ating an exemption, but we can only guess how much investment and
trade is generated to benefit an economy. The effect of section 911 is
particularly difficult to measure in terms of corporate personnel abroad,
for this type of tax incentive would be a very minor consideration in
corporate plans. The basic problem is that little study has been done
and our knowledge of the effects of taxation and foreign investment on
employment decisions is inadequate. Blough, General Analyses of
Issues Facing Management, in TAx INSTIjTE, supra note 20, at 74-75(1960). See Hellawell, supra note 46, at 1412. It may be that until
an extensive study is conducted on the effects of incentives on invest-
ment, only logic is available to assess one form of tax incentive against
another. See Hellawell, supra note 46, at 1413. See also BITTKER & EBB,
supra note 42, at 21.
48. Wilkins, A Note on the "Gore Amendment," 18 NAT'L TAx. J.
321, 324 (1965).
49. Taxation of Incomes in Selected Countries-expressed as dol-
lars and in percent of Total Income paid in tax. (1967 income taxes
computed with standard deductions and exemptions using exchange
rates of December, 1968.). For explanation of "(A)," see note 50 infra.
$10,000 $15,000 $20,000
Tax in $ % of Tax in $ % of Tax in$ % of
Inc. Inc. Inc.(A) Great Britain 2535.7 25.4 4587.2 30.6 7273.3 36.4(A) Germany 1982.5 19.8 3820.5 25.4 5914.0 29.6
Turkey 3854.5 38.5 6587.6 63.9 9330.8 46.7
Argentina 2475.20 24.8 4739.2 31.6 7349.9 36.7(A) Canada 1567.0 15.7 3292.2 22.0 5468.4 27.3
Columbia 2531.2 25.3 4469.0 29.8 6500.5 32.5
[Vol. 54:823
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would appear to be no inducement whatever because income
taxes imposed abroad are equal or higher than those imposed
in the United States. The disparity between the United States
and a foreign country's income tax normally widens as income
reaches the upper brackets, particularly in developing coun-
tries.50
Greece 2051.1 20.5 4714.3 31.4 7846.1 39.2
Mexico 1154.0 11.5 2192.0 14.6 3499.0 17.5Ceylon 4753.4 47.5 8752.0 58.3 12753.0 63.8
Pakistan 2357.3 23.6 5302.3 34.7 8464.5 42.3
India 4591.2 45.9 8225.5 54.9 11982.0 59.9Ghana 3377.2 33.8 6653.5 44.4 10153.1 50.8(A) New Zealand 3003.6 30.0 6125.0 40.8 9500.4 47.5
Philippines 1980.0 19.0 3940.0 29.4 6130.0 33.2
Venezuela 671.5 6.7 1210.9 8.1 1802.6 9.0
Uruguay 3040.8 30.4 5515.8 36.8 7990.8 40.0(A) Japan 3088.0 30.8 5865.7 39.1 8931.5 44.7
United States
& Minnesota 1556.0 15.6 2993.2 20.0 4422.3 22.1
The tax computations used in this study were from the most recent
available data, and although some figures may not represent taxes abroad
exactly as they would be today, the general picture at least is a true one.
Tax comparisons are always dangerous because of differing structures
of local and national taxes, differing types of taxes imposed, and differ-
ing levels of tax morality. The objective here was not a precise statis-
tical study, but rather an effort to point out alternative possible im-
provements in section 911 based on observation of facts available. Given
the state of knowledge concerning the effects of tax incentives, exemp-
tions like section 911 are a speculation, and whether a country opts for
them may simply depend on the relative positions in the scale of values
of conserving public revenue as opposed to the development of the less
developed world. Further detailed study is obviously necessary to
determine the effects of tax incentives on foreign investments so that a
more cohesive total approach to foreign aid, making maximum use of
tax incentives, can be designed. See Hellawell, supra note 46, at 1413;
Kurtz, Tax Incentives: Their Use and Misuse, in S. CAL. TwENTiETH
TAX INSTITUTE, MAJOR TAx PLANNING FOR 1968 4.
50. The Ratio of Tax to Total Income at Varying Income Levels
Developed Countries* Undeveloped Countries*
$10,000 25.9 29.3
$15,000 33.8 39.3
$20,000 38.2 43.0
*excludes United States but includes Countries above marked "(A)"
*excludes Venezuela but includes the remainder not marked "(A)"
In other countries, tax tables are computed on the basis of standards
of living and average incomes found in that country. Therefore, a rea-
sonable salary for a technician or a manager in the United States may be
in the highest, most heavily taxed bracket abroad because the standards
of living are lower there, and the technician's income reflects the high
standard of living here. If income taxes abroad are higher than those
in this country, no revenue is lost by section 911 because sections 901 to
904 of the Code-the tax credit for taxes paid to foreign countries-
would credit the foreign income taxes paid against the United States in-
come tax. The tax credit provided by these sections gives credit for
foreign income and profits taxes paid against United States taxes that
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These statistics may be deceptive, however,5 1 because in
many instances, section 911 does offer a tax benefit to a United
States citizen. First of all, a few countries recognize that em-
ployment of expatriates, especially those with technical skills, is
an aid to their economy. Consequently, by statute or custom,
they may afford special tax relief to such individuals for the first
few years of employment. 52 Though in general, expatriates are
given the same tax treatment as nationals, 53 the section 911
exemption at least allows other countries to use this type of tax
relief to attract skilled people. Second, the informal tax admin-
istration of many foreign countries leads to disparity between
published tax rates and taxes actually paid.5 4 Third, the exemp-
tion eliminates the possibility of double taxation for those citi-
zens who meet its standards. Citizens who are abroad for less
than 18 months, however, will pay the high indirect taxes of
foreign countries5 5 in addition to United States income taxes
because the foreign tax credit, (sections 901 to 904), does not
recognize these indirect taxes.56 The tax credit also nullifies the
benefits of inducement exemptions granted by developing coun-
tries because United States citizens abroad who do not qualify
are to be paid. If foreign income and profits taxes are in excess of
United States taxes due, no United States tax need be paid.
51. At least one writer is in direct disagreement with these tax
figures: stating that many developing countries do have lower taxes
or the fiscal incentive would make no sense. To the extent that rates
in a developing country are lower than in an industrialized country
using the exemption approach, its investors enjoy a tax advantage by
investing in developing countries. FiscAL INcENTIvEs, supra note 22,
at 18.
52. India, Pakistan and Ceylon are examples of this type of tax
relief. Indonesia normally grants tax relief by custom rather than by
statutory authority. This tax incentive is somewhat of a dilemma for a
developing country which must decide whether to tax income now or
anticipate that a tax incentive may induce future economic growth.
GOVERNMENT GuARANTEEs, supra note 37, at 57.
53. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 32, at 24.
54. TAx MANAGEMENT, INc., supra note 24, at 77.
55. The foreign tax credit granted United States citizens applies
only to foreign income and excess proEts taxes paid. To the extent
that other nations may rely on higher sede, wealth, excise, property or
other indirect taxes for revenue, rather than the income tax, and also
to the extent other nations have a different basis for their income tax
and differing concepts of subordinate taxing authority, a United States
citizen is subject to double taxation. See 67 CONG. REc. 3781 (1926). In
many countries, because of low income tax morality, other taxes are
relied upon for government revenue which are easier to collect, for
example, sales, property, use, wealth, or excise taxes. FiscAL IN-
CENTrVEs, supra note 22, at 16.
56. See text accompanying note 81 infra.
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for section 911 benefits will still pay full United States taxes.57
A fourth factor, which mitigates the effect of high foreign taxes
imposed on citizens employed by United States corporations, is
the practice of paying part of an employee's salary to a deposi-
tory in the United States.58 The expatriate pays taxes only on
that portion of income received in the foreign country from
services rendered in that country.59
If tax rates are oppressive, the employee will report as in-
come only that minimal amount which is reasonable to tax au-
thorities of the foreign country.60 A foreign taxing authority
has only one way to find out whether a taxpayer has omitted
part of his income. If his country has a tax treaty with the
United States, he can ask his United States counterpart for in-
formation on an individual's total income. It is not clear, how-
ever, to what extent this provision of the tax treaties has been
used.61 Companies also favor stock plans, pension benefits, life
insurance and unlimited expense accounts to avoid oppressive
57. The tax credit was probably not intended to reduce the tax
burden on United States taxpayers to the level chosen by any foreign
country. It was adopted to prevent a lack of uniformity because of
high foreign tax rates. Surrey, Current Issues in Taxation of Corporate
Foreign Investment, 56 COLum. L. REv. 815, 824 (1956). The very prem-
ise of taxation on the basis of citizenship seems subject to attack,
however. See text accompanying note 79 infra. The credit in the in-
stance of developing countries is also in conflict with our political and
economic objective. See text accompanying notes 82-86 infra. These
overriding political and economic considerations indicate that United
States citizens working in developing areas should be compensated
through the tax system to assist in offsetting hardships and providing an
incentive.
58. Ninety percent of the companies who have men abroad use
splitting, but it is done for other reasons in addition to tax saving:
(1) The need for dollars in the United States to pay obli-
gations here.(2) Inflation, foreign exchange controls, and currency depreci-
ation make it desirable to protect money in United States
banks with foreign branches.(3) The need to equalize payment in the foreign country with
that received by the foreign nationals.
BusINESS INTERNATIONAL CORP., WORLDWIDE ExEcuTvm COMPENSATION
26 (1967). The result is that part of the employees' income is taxed at
the high rates abroad, and the remainder under $20,000 or $25,000 is
not taxed.
59. The section 911 exemption coupled with the potential tax
savings of splitting income allows corporate employees increased after-
tax compensation. The corporation, therefore, can deduct tax savings
to the employee from the premium it would normally have to pay
foreign employees.
60. WORLDWIDE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 58, at 26.
61. Id. at 24.
19701
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
overseas tax rates. The employee might include in the latter all
of his living expenses, including residence and transportation.
Most nations demand that this type of reimbursed expense be
included in income, but detection of this type of tax avoidance
without access to the corporation's accounts is almost impossible.
Section 911 may be of more benefit to partnerships or sole
proprietors, particularly "if the business consists of the perform-
ance of personal services, and capital is not a material income-
producing factor .... ,,62 If capital is a material income produc-
ing factor, only a certain amount, in no case exceeding 30 percent
of an individual's share of the net profits of the business, may
be treated as compensation for services rendered by him. 3 In
the case of a sole proprietor or a partnership earning income
solely through personal services, all profits qualify as compensa-
tion under section 911 and receive the full benefit of the exemp-
tion. Since the tax rates are frequently higher abroad, however,
it may be that the section has diminished influence on all smaller
enterprises and individuals because they lack the capability to
split their incomes or utilize unreported expense accounts, espe-
cially when all their income is generated and transferred within
the foreign country. Often even the tax incentives given by de-
veloping countries are of little value because the incentives nor-
mally expire in two to five years, and smaller enterprises may
earn no income for several years.
As the previous discussion has indicated, the exemption does
not have the necessary scope to act as an effective incentive to
induce citizens to work abroad. As tax morality increases, and as
more tax treaties are negotiated, avoidance techniques will prove
less successful, and section 911 will cease to function as an incen-
tive in most foreign nations. Although the provision is of some
current value to corporations in reducing salary costs, it is prob-
ably a minor element of the investment decision. The provision
is of even less value to small enterprises because there are fewer
opportunities to escape high foreign taxes through income split-
ting and other avoidance techniques.
The inadequacy of the exemption in fulfilling its stated ob-
62. Lyons, Private Investment Abroad and the Federal Income Tax,
37 VA. L. Rzv. 909, 916 (1951). See note 41 supra. Although with a
corporation the exemption allowed by section 911 may be a very minor
consideration, the total income of a partnership or of an individual may
be directly affected.
63. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 911(b). See Treas. Reg. § 1.911-1(a)(5) (1969). The balance which he receives therefore is taxable.
[Vol. 54:823
SECTION 911 TAX REFORM
jective of increasing foreign trade is apparent. Unless the section
is to be restricted to its role as an equalizing mechanism which
operates more equitably than the tax credit, the section should
be altered so that it can accomplish at least its original objectives.
C. THE EcoNomic EFFECTS OF SECTION 911
To the extent that section 911 is presently effective, it may
be encouraging American technicians and managers to go abroad
and thus increase foreign trade. This result may not be entirely
beneficial, however, to the United States economy, and other
more negative aspects should be weighed in any policy re-evalua-
tion. Tax exemptions like section 911 which are directed at en-
couraging United States citizens to go abroad are suspect cur-
rently because the limitation of United States foreign private in-
vestment is a plank of our foreign economic policy designed to
support our balance of payments position.6" The presence of
skilled personnel abroad would not of itself result in balance of
payments problems if their compensation is paid by sources
within the foreign country. However, if payment comes from
the United States, the dollars would be spent abroad in a finan-
cial transfer of currency for foreign goods. To the extent that
this financial transfer is not offset by increased exports from
the United States generated by our citizens abroad, balance of
payments difficulties will result.
In addition to possible balance of payments ramifications,
if the supply of labor resources is barely sufficient for full satis-
faction of demand in the domestic economy, but labor resources
are continuing to be sent abroad, there is some potential for
damaging shortages of trained personnel, resulting in inflation-
ary tendencies. 65 If labor resources are not fully employed, how-
ever, their utility is greater abroad where they may create oppor-
tunities for domestic growth through international trade.
These potential problems of balance of payments and labor
bottlenecks are not likely, nor are they large. Investment in less
developed countries should be accorded special treatment as the
United States has already done with the interest equalization
tax, the voluntary programs to limit investment abroad,66 the
64. See Schenk & Balkin, Subpart G Tax Incentives for Export
Trade: A Technical Analysis of Tax Haven Operations, 54 MiNN. L.
REV. 245, 250-54 (1969).
65. KRAUSE & DAm, supra note 17, at 61.
66. See Hellawell, supra note 46, at 1393.
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Revenue Act of 1962,67 and the Western Hemisphere Trade Cor-
poration provisions.6 8 Programs to help those countries in par-
ticular should not be hampered because of the vital political in-
terest and the immense economic possibilities inherent in their
development.
V. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO SECTION 911
Tax neutrality and tax equality are two issues which must
be considered when discussing any tax provision which grants
preferential treatment to certain taxpayers. The doctrine of tax
neutrality demands that taxation cause as little interference as
possible with economic decision making.6 9 A broader definition
of tax neutrality would find a tax efficiently structured so long
as it does not cause taxpayers to change their behavior in so-
cially undesirable ways.7 0 The doctrine of tax equality demands
that substantially the same tax burden be imposed on all citizens
within the same tax jurisdiction who earn equivalent incomes.7 1
Although concepts of tax equality may rebel against allowing
tax benefits to citizens abroad, arguments for international tax
neutrality, fairness in assessing taxes only for government serv-
ices received 2 and foreign policy considerations 73 justify allow-
ing exemptions for foreign income, particularly in the case of
developing countries.
The past denial of tax reduction for foreign personal income
has been based on several theories-primarily the fact that not
67. Surrey, The United States Tax System and International Tax
Relationships, 43 TAXES 6, 25 (1965).
68. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 921, 922.
69. See Hellawell, supra note 46, at 1409. See KRAuSE & DAIM,
supra note 17, at 45. World resource allocation, if not domestic resource
allocation, is most efficient if each country taxes income earned in that
country; resources can then seek the highest return. KRAUSE & DAm,
supra note 17, at 50.
70. Surrey & Brannon, Simplification and Equity as Goals of Tax
Policy, 9 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 915, 916 (1968).
71. Hellawell, supra note 46, at 1410. See KRAUSE & DAM, supra
note 17, at 54; Surrey & Brannon, supra note 70, at 915.
72. Domestic and international tax neutrality demand that risk
and hardship beyond normal conditions be taken into account in asses-
sing a tax, and more important, that a tax should reflect the goods
and services provided by the government, and these are definitely re-
duced when a citizen is abroad. In the ideal economic model, taxes
should not exceed the market value of government services. KRAUSE
& DAM, supra note 17, at 48, 50.
73. Under the broader definition of tax neutrality, a tax exemp-
tion designed to encourage investment in developing countries would
be acceptable in any case because it parallels our foreign policy.
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all foreign investment involves more risk than domestic enter-
prises, and the United States does not differentiate among the
latter except for natural resources. Furthermore, there is no
concrete proof that tax reduction will increase foreign invest-
ment, and it is argued that the United States should not violate
tax equality without substantial evidence that investment will
occur which would not occur absent the reduction.
74
Critics also point out that not all incentives can be granted
or the tax system would be incapable of producing income.75
In addition to the sacrifice of revenue, such a change would allow
foreign countries to determine the rate of tax on United States
citizens and result in loss of control of the international economic
effects of our tax policy. There is a possibility that resources will
be misallocated because an enterprise could decide which juris-
diction to enter solely for tax avoidance purposes. All argu-
ments opposing this reduction of taxes neglect the fundamental
point that the taxation of foreign income should not be analogous
to the taxation of domestic income; taxation of foreign income
should occur at the origin, not on the basis of citizenship. The
international economy will be best served by such a policy. Ar-
guments in favor of the maintenance of tax equality carry some
weight, but other policy considerations seem more important.
In the balance, tax equality should be subordinated to them in
the instances set forth in the following discussion.
The ideal international tax system, allowing for the most
efficient allocation of resources, would be one which rejects the
historical test of taxation on the basis of citizenship and taxes
in proportion to the contribution to the production of income.70
The concept is basically one of international tax neutrality,
where taxes primarily reflect the economic benefits received
from the taxing government.77 This would allow free flow of
74. Surrey, The United States Taxation of Foreign Income, 1 J. or
LAw & EcoN. 72, 82 (1958).
75. Kurtz, supra note 49, at 5.
76. INT'L CHA-IaER OF CommERC, AvoIDANcE or DOUBLE TAXATION
5 (1955). The country of origin provides peace and order and the
conditions in which income could be produced. The country of citizen-
ship can claim nothing except a reasonable sum for government services
given a citizen abroad.
77. American courts have not shared the view sometimes expressed
in other nations that the moral right to tax derives from a state's pro-
tection given to the taxpayer. Nicholson, The Exemption of Incomes
of Visiting United States Directors and Employees and Problems of
International Tax Evasion, 41 AusT. L.J. 119, 123 (1967). See Cook v.
Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924). See note 22 supra.
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capital and labor to those areas where it is in the most need and
would be most usefully employed.
78
Following this reasoning, the country of origin would have
the exclusive right to tax all income produced within its bor-
ders.79 In order to prevent double taxation or tax avoidance,
the allocation of income between countries must be defined,
either by bilateral treaties or by applying unilateral rules to each
country's citizens. The most reasonable unilateral approach may
be to subject American citizens to tax until they meet residency
requirements abroad, usually six months, and then grant an ex-
emption.
The present lack of tax morality in many countries, however,
makes it impractical to pursue a complete elimination of taxation
on foreign personal income. It is necessary to restrict the poten-
tial benefit so that abuses similar to those encountered in the
original version of section 911 will not recur. There are several
possible programs which, if combined with or incorporated into
section 911, would aid in overcoming the limitations set forth
earlier. Two minimum modifications are immediately appar-
ent. First, since compensation of many skilled technicians and
managers is above the unrealistically low ceilings that are cur-
rently imposed on the exemption, these ceilings should be
raised.8 0 Second, to complement section 911, the tax credit in
section 901 should not be limited to income taxes alone, but
should encompass, in a flexible manner, the entire tax structure
of a foreign country. Many nations utilize primarily indirect
taxes rather than the income tax, and the result is double taxa-
tion.":
78. Lindholm, National Tax System and International Balance
of Payments, 19 NAT'L TAx J. 163 (1966).
79. The alternative solution of not allowing the country in which
income is produced to tax the income of aliens, even if the aliens meet
the residency requirements, is clearly inequitable as long as the citizens
of the United States are the predominant factor in the international econ-
omy. This would allow the United States Government to collect taxes
from its citizens abroad when the larger part of the government services
used in producing the income are proviled by the foreign nation. It
does not appear as inequitable to maintain that aliens be taxed in
their country of citizenship until they meet the residency requirements of
another nation.
80. If the objective of these limits is to prevent excessive tax
avoidance, certainly $30,000 to $40,000 ceilings are not excessive but
rather fair compensation for a skilled man who receives a premium for
working abroad.
81. See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra. There continues to
be a great need for research into this area to find workable and de-
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These modifications suffice to allow fair treatment of those
United States citizens employed in other industrial nations. Due
to the balance of payments problem, it is no longer in the na-
tional interest to grant additional inducements to invest capital
or labor in developed countries.8 2 The immediate interest of in-
creasing domestic investments, thereby increasing the purchasing
power of domestic consumers and meeting budgetary obligations,
outweighs the long term interest in foreign investments. How-
ever, foreign policy considerations demand increased efforts to
foster economic growth in underdeveloped nations. Developing
countries should also be favored for economic reasons: (1) such
investment has a better short-run balance of payments effect,
particularly in increasing United States exports; 3 (2) this type
of investment secures a long range position in new markets and
sources of supply, and (3) these markets are in some instances
more open to entrepreneurs. 84
Ten years ago, it could be argued that the minimal benefits
which accrued from tax incentives for investment in developing
countries could not justify a departure from traditional notions
of tax equality"';-particularly when the United States was dis-
fensible criteria for selection among foreign taxes for credit purposes.
If the credit extends to all taxes, there may be large windfalls to some
taxpayers. Surrey, supra note 57, at 819-22.
82. It is no longer appropriate for our tax laws to offer incentives
to invest in developed countries, since there is now a growing similarity
in the investment climate of the United States and the developed world.
Our interests are not served by encouraging investment capital to leave
the United States for other industrialized countries rather than to re-
main here. Surrey, supra note 67, at 24. The 1962 legislation was
aimed at dampening enthusiasm for foreign investment-except in less
developed countries, indicating an awareness that less developed coun-
tries should continue to receive preferred treatment. KRAUSE & DAM,
supra note 17, at 22.
83. Hellawell, supra note 46, at 1393. This is because there are
shortages of foreign exchange in developing areas, causing money to be
spent immediately on manufactured goods which are not available
locally and must be purchased in industrial countries like the United
States.
84. Id. The lack of entrepreneurial skills in many less developed
areas means that excellent potential opportunities often go neglected
until foreign investors take advantage of them. In addition to help-
ing the development of the unindustrialized nations, American private
investment and trade abroad will benefit the United States through an
increase in international trade and the eventual return in the form of
dividends and interest.
85. Professor Surrey has emphasized in the past that tax incentives
run counter to tax equality, and incentives are not a proper vehicle to
induce desired economic behavior. "[O]ur tax laws would soon degen-
erate into an endless array of different rate schedules for different activ-
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tributing abundant amounts of foreign aid to many underde-
veloped countries. The point was emphasized that private in-
vestment could not meet many of the pressing needs of the un-
derdeveloped areas, specifically social overhead projects which
require government financing.8 Present conditions do not sup-
port the same conclusion. A number of less developed countries
have constructed infrastructures of social overhead capital which
can meet the minimum requirements of certain industries despite
a decreasing flow of foreign aid. In these countries private in-
dustry and investment could now assume a leading role in gen-
erating economic growth.
Previous tax differentials have helped to induce desired eco-
nomic behavior in spite of the alleged complexity of the
variables.87 Considering the importance of skilled labor re-
sources to developing countries, it appears worthwhile to formu-
late tax incentives which may influence skilled personnel to work
abroad, even at the risk of windfall tax avoidance to a few
United States citizens.
[T]he stress on the capital needs of underdeveloped areas may
well obscure other and more pressing needs .... [T]hese
countries are acutely in need of industrial skills at all levels.
It may well be that a flow of efficient corporate vice-presidents
is far more important to our foreign economic policy than a flow
of corporate dollars.8 8
Even though section 911 is not presently directed at developing
countries, these factors suggest that the design of section 911 be
altered so as to reflect policy considerations which have arisen
since its enactment.8 9
ities and become useless as an instrument of major fiscal policy."
Surrey, supra note 74, at 96. Professor Surrey also points out that such
an incentive will grant windfall profits to the recipients who would
have invested anyway. The solution, in his opinion, must be found out-
side the tax laws. Id.
86. Id. at 81, 83. Surrey, supra note 57, at 842.
87. Tax considerations can exercise considerable influence over
investment decisions as the investment credit and the capital gains
provisions bear witness. Although tax considerations are more com-
plex in regard to international business decisions it is reasonable to be-
lieve taxes are still considered as an important factor in business opera-
tion.
88. Surrey, supra note 57, at 843.
89. The encouragement of private investment and the divulgence
of our technical skill to underdeveloped countries will help increase
the productive capabilities of these nations. Although there may be
some risk of eventual competition from these countries, technical aid
is generally concerned with the most fundamental aspects of produc-
tion, and the threat does not seem so great an evil that it counter-
balances the positive effects which our technical aid may bring. N.
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An intensified effort at negotiating bilateral trade and tax
treaties with underdeveloped countries is probably the most ef-
fective method of dealing with problems of double taxation and
establishing a favorable investment climate.90 However, very
few treaties have been concluded between capital-importing and
capital-exporting countries,91 indicating difficulties which may
prevent a reliable network of bilateral protection.2 Unlike the
United States, most developing countries have no enterprises or
citizens abroad in need of protection from double taxation.
These nations seek other concessions, in the form of aid or trade
agreements, before accepting a tax treaty; such concessions are
often not forthcoming. As an interim measure, it is urged that
the residency requirement for defined underdeveloped countries
be reduced to the time the country itself requires for income tax
purposes. If no residency requirement exists, the section 911
exemption would be available immediately. This will largely
eliminate double taxation on personnel who are employed in
developing areas for periods of less than eighteen months.
Since tax incentives in general are inverse methods of in-
ducing desired behavior, a direct subsidy would be a rational
method of encouraging specific activities.93 Such a subsidy
would probably exclude the larger international corporations,
at least until tax treaties are negotiated or underdeveloped coun-
tries increase their tax enforcement. Employees of international
corporations enjoy the benefits of tax splitting, unreported ex-
pense accounts and other devices, and the tax exemption already
results in substantial tax savings. These tax avoidance schemes
BucHANAN & H. ELLIs, APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 442-
43 (1955); See INTERNATiONAL Aims, supra note 10, at 19-20. Well-
designed tax incentives can be most helpful in increasing United States
business activity in these countries. KRAuSE & DAM, supra note 17, at
80.
90. ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 3. See
FISCAL INcENTIvEs, supra note 22, at 15.
91. The United States has some 24 tax treaties with other nations,
most of which are industrially developed. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 1016 (1968).
92. ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 5. "[I]t
takes time to negotiate bilateral tax treaties, ... both through 'positive'
steps of providing tax inducements or through the 'negative' approach
of eliminating existing tax obstacles to such investment .... " FISCAL
INCENT=VES, supra note 22, at 15.
93. M. TAYLOR, INDUSTRIAL TAX-EXEMPTION IN PUERTO Rico 142-43
(1957). For advantages and disadvantages of a subsidy, see id. at 152.
Generally, it is important that the subsidy not be indiscriminate and
that it have selectivity and flexibility.
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are unavailable to the smaller units, and a subsidy would provide
a more certain incentive. A subsidy proposal, however, faces
several barriers unconnected with its usefulness but which might
hinder its passage. Most evident is a Congressional reluctance to
grant direct foreign aid, and this form of subsidy is basically
direct foreign aid.9
4
Certainly section 911 is not of crucial importance to continu-
ing increases in foreign trade, but an overall plan of encouraging
skilled people to go to developing countries is essential. This
objective of inducing technicians and managers to work in un-
derdeveloped nations can be most effectively reached if section
911 is incorporated into a general program combining subsidies,
foreign aid to develop social overhead capital and continuing ef-
forts at treaty negotiation. Section 911 functions best as an in-
centive when the creation of minimal social overhead capital has
been undertaken and entrepreneurial opportunities are available.
A tax incentive cannot help until taxable income can be gener-
ated. The Government may be best advised in some poorer
countries to undertake additional public expenditures to provide
a favorable climate for private investment of labor and capital
abroad. These expenditures will initially be more effective in-
ducements than tax reduction."
When section 911 cannot function adequately as an induce-
ment, a subsidy can provide a more direct inducement. The
United States can also make valuable contributions to the ef-
fectiveness of section 911 by reducing import barriers and pro-
moting free multilateral trade. This will help to open up new
opportunities abroad. A first step in the direction of free move-
ment of labor and the equal treatment of resident and nonresi-
dent aliens would be the elimination of double taxation through
treaties, alterations in section 911 and the foreign tax credit.
Although too much administrative procedure will raise costs
unworthy of the benefits, it would be desirable to grant some
discretion to the executive branch in the administration and co-
ordination of these programs. 96 It is evident that some countries
do not want our assistance; with those that do, the executive
94. See Kurtz, supra note 49, at 4. Congress dislikes the estab-
lishment of new administrative bodies because of the expense involved.
When tax measures are involved, the administrating body is already in
existence.
95. INTERNATIONAL EcoNomNcs, supra note 11, at 149.
96. See INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 955(c) (3) which allows the
President to name developing countries.
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could bargain somewhat for greater self-help. The capability to
tailor a program to a particular country would be of value.
Executive discretion might extend, within limits, to granting of
subsidies, allowing for greater selectivity and flexibility,97 and
to altering to some extent the ceilings and time limitations on
exemptions. This could be coordinated with foreign aid pro-
grams which the executive may propose to the Congress. The
executive could also minimize misallocation of resources by with-
holding benefits in instances where tax avoidance is the only
motive involved. A coordinated program of this type would give
section 911 substantially greater influence on investment and
employment decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States, as evidenced by changes made in the tax
laws in 1962 and 1966, is in the process of developing rules to
produce a rational system of taxing international transactions
in order to provide as much certainty as possible to those en-
gaged in international trade. In the instance of section 911, there
continues to be a need for equitable and workable guidelines.
The rising rate of taxes abroad makes it doubtful whether the
original objectives of section 911 are attainable as the section is
presently constructed. Only minor revisions, however, are re-
quired to enable the exemption to grant Americans abroad a po-
sition of equality with their competitors.
It seems possible that if the exemption given in section 911
were coordinated to a greater degree with other programs, it may
be able to make a significant contribution to our foreign policy
objectives in regard to developing countries. The long-run de-
velopment of these countries will be beneficial to United States
trade, although initial adjustments may be painful.)" It is possi-
ble for the United States to do far more with invisible tax in-
centives to promote growth in developing countries. These indi-
rect methods of granting government aid are perhaps the only
alternative to direct government aid.
97. See text accompanying note 93 supra. As social overhead
capital grows, administrative discretion could increase exemptions to
maximize their effectiveness.
98. BITTKER & EBB, supra note 42, at 21-22.
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